DT挖掘機爆料 P4實驗室第3季 (1)

【DT挖掘機團隊】

序言

香港女英雄科學家閆麗夢的成功出逃和發聲爆料CCP病毒真相猶如石破天驚,中共也因此開始了集中抹黑和信息封鎖行徑,又再玩他們慣用的那壹套伎倆。

基於此,為了讓更多的人了解真相,DT挖掘戰隊緊急行動,在《P4實驗室第二季》的基礎上,進行了這次挖掘行動,為希望了解真相的人們披露更多的線索,同時,也揭開我們的第三季的序幕。

特別強調的是,本次挖掘的內容全部來自可查詢的互聯網資源,對於其中可能涉及到個人隱私在此壹並致歉,DT沒有任何意願侵害所涉及人員的個人隱私。由於CCP病毒牽扯面之廣、影響之深,等於全人類所共同面對的壹場大劫難,DT挖掘的真實目的在於揭示這場全世界大瘟疫的產生本源,以期望有關人士和國家齊心協力從根本上鏟除邪惡生化武器產生的溫床,還人類壹個安全、平安的生存環境。

關於閆夢麗的壹些資料,在GNEWS上已經有戰友的壹篇文章《“英雄科學家”閆麗夢被CCP刪掉了什麽資料》鏈接地址為:https://test.gnews.org/zh-hans/259481/進行初步挖掘,在這裏不再贅述。

在開始挖掘之前,我們先是做壹些基礎數據的準備,包括對這篇完整的總結:

挖掘基礎數據準備

A 英雄科學家基礎資料【摘自上述文章】

B 網絡上包括FOX視頻節目中出現的英雄科學家的照片

我們在挖掘之前先對這七張照片做初步解讀,奠定我們這次挖掘的數據基礎。

A 人物特征識別 由於照片1、2、3、4均為正面照片,人物特征十分明顯,可以簡單的總結為“過肩長發、戴眼鏡、露齒微笑、身材勻稱”為其主要特征,面部識別度較高的美女。

B 工作相關照片 照片5、6清楚地表明了美女科學家的工作單位和相關同事,其中照片5為其在發表的論文前的照片,胸牌和論文上側的信息應該能夠表明其工作單位,可惜照片太模糊看不清楚。照片6中有壹個帶眼鏡的男人沒有遮掉,這個人應該很重要。

C 結婚照照片 這張照片基本表明了美女科學家的家庭關系,包括丈夫家庭和自己的家庭,就是美女科學家嫁給了壹個外國人(斯裏蘭卡人),此君家庭包括父母和壹個姐姐(或妹妹)(姐姐為推測)和壹個弟弟;美女科學家家庭包括父母和壹個弟弟。結婚婚禮地址應為國外某個著名景點,背景中有壹個教堂。

那麽依據以上兩組基礎資料我們展開我們的挖掘之旅。

1、美女科學家工作照片挖掘

在上述的基礎資料中,實際上提出了以下挖掘目標:

1、美女科學家的工作單位到底是哪裏

2、美女科學家的相關論文

3、美女科學家的同事。

我們圍繞這三個目標依次展開

在展開解讀之前我們先出示壹組照片,並做分別的解讀,解讀完這些照片,以上問題自然明朗。

註意這些照片是在CCP及其領導的香港大學對網絡上的美女科學家資料進行全面清理後挖掘出來的,具體怎麽挖掘只是壹個技術問題,在這裏再次聲明都是來自公開的網站資料。

照片1 2015年 2015年11月24日 Students and lecturers of the 8th HKU-Pasteur Immunology Course. 在這張照片中,美女科學家眼睛沒有看照相機鏡頭,很容易找到,不過這時頭發較短。這個會議名稱翻譯為“第八屆香港大學-巴斯德免疫學課程的學生和講師”,也就是說美女科學家在這裏的職位不是學生就是講師。為了看的更清楚我們提供壹個局部放大版。

在這張照片的解讀中我們記住壹個關鍵的名稱:8th HKU-Pasteur Immunology Course。

照片2 2017年 在這張照片中美女科學家依舊是招牌微笑動作,也很明顯。

局部放大版

照片3 2019年 照片標題Tremendous success for the 10th Immunology Course Anniversary Symposium! 以下出示的是壹組照片,照片的總的題目是“第十屆免疫學課程年度研討會取得巨大成功!”在這組照片中,同時出現了壹位和美女科學家相關的關鍵人物。這是第壹張照片,參加這次會議的人員合影。美女科學家依舊很明顯。

此為局部放大圖

下面兩張圖是在不同角度幾乎同壹時間拍攝的場景,我們的美女科學家在和另外壹個外籍男科學家與壹個帶眼鏡的白頭發科學家討論事情。註意第壹張照片三個人位置和角度,可以看出美女科學家和中間這位頭發密集的科學家的同事關系。在右側圖中我們標出這三個人討論問題的位置以及左側照片拍攝的角度。

註意下組這個照片,上面和美女科學家壹起參與討論的那個長頭發年輕外籍科學家和美女科學家在餐桌上坐在壹起。右側的照片為這張餐桌在美女科學家這個角度拍照所顯示的結果。

我們將左側的照片局部放大

右側為同壹餐桌敬酒幹杯時的照片,美女科學家騰出位置給壹位帶眼鏡的男士敬酒而站在另壹側。

上圖中與美女科學家壹起討論的兩個人我們在第壹張的合影中壹起標出。

這組照片不僅證明了我們的美女科學家參與了2019年的這次研討會,更為重要的是,在會後準備就餐和就餐的過程中,她壹直和壹個男科學家(斯裏蘭卡籍)在壹起,壹起與人交流,相鄰就座用餐,那麽他們之間是僅僅的同事關系嗎?這是這壹組照片揭示的挖掘線索。

2 挖挖美女科學家的結婚照

在開始挖掘第二張結婚照照片之前DT還是想說說DT如何進行挖掘的事情。

已經有偽類開始叫板和抹黑我們的英雄美女科學家,他們所謂的論點只能說明他們的愚昧無知。

首先DT挖掘機多次聲明全部的挖掘調查資料均來自互聯網上可查詢的公開資料,不可能去使用暗網或者花錢去購買所謂的情報資料,當然使用壹些信息查詢網站如果需要會員付費DT也會掏錢的(比如天眼查和國外的金融資料查詢網站和壹些論文 查詢網站)。上面的照片均來自網絡,下面出具的照片也來自網絡查詢。為了給偽類們普及壹下DT的挖掘手段,特在這裏花費壹段文字給他們科普壹下,以免他們又弱智地認為這是DT的陰謀論或者說是從七哥手中拿到的內部資料了。

在互聯網上搜尋到這些資料路徑很簡單,就是要從根本上明白CCP刪除信息的邏輯和方法。英雄科學家出逃美國是幾個月前的事情,為了應對這件事,CCP必須在互聯網上刪除相關的信息進行掩蓋,換句話說,如果CCP在網絡上刪除了相關的信息,只能證明兩件事:A 這個英雄科學家的出逃這件事是真的;B 這位科學家對於他們十分重要。好了,我們這次查詢是在英雄科學家的露臉之後,也就是說網絡上的相關信息CCP已經進行了大量的清除。這就產生第二個問題:是否還存在沒有被清除的信息和資料。換句話說,首先明確CCP能夠在互聯網上刪除哪些信息?明白了這壹點就會知道CCP不會有能力刪除所有的相關信息。

簡單地總結壹下:CCP能夠屏蔽並清除的信息方法包括:1、擁有管理權限的信息 2、 通過搜索引擎屏蔽信息搜索。3、黑客信息發布的網站。(這壹點很少用)

其中1就包括直接命令香港大學、英雄科學家經歷過的學校等有關單位刪除相關信息,包括命令所掌控的論文發表單位或者平臺刪除或者修改論文作者順序和名稱等。2 國內所有的搜索引擎已經屏蔽包括英雄科學家姓名在內的壹些關鍵詞。 明白了這壹點就知道CCP不能刪除的信息在哪,壹定還會有也就是中共不能刪除信息,第壹類是個人的社交賬號中的信息,比如FACEBOOK、TWITTER這樣的社交平臺,因為這些賬戶的管理權限壹般不在中共手中。美女科學家位於香港大學,從事科研工作,香港科學家的社交平臺習慣使用的壹般就是FACEBOOK,和國內的聯系應該是微信。所以找到美女科學家的FACEBOOK賬號十分關鍵,因為這個賬號控制在美女科學家手中,CCP不可能短時間內刪除,並且這個賬號壹定是和工作無關的,刪除的價值不大,但是以中共對FACEBOOK的控制手段壹般會在搜索中刻意屏蔽,很難找。第二類是單位已經刊發到網絡上新聞報道,這個涉及轉載,發布平臺等諸多問題是很難刪除的,但是中共屏蔽了搜索引擎的搜索僅僅找起來麻煩而已。第三類是國外平臺發布的論文等內容,這個涉及到管理權限的問題CCP很難刪除的。所以明白了中共不能刪除的信息資料包括哪些,就有可能找到這些有價值的信息了。

本文出示的壹些資料DT挖掘戰隊已經在《P4實驗室第二季》的挖掘資料準備中進行過壹次挖掘,很多資料已經具備,只不過在第二季中沒有註意到美女科學家,而是把重點放在另外壹些關鍵的人物上,而這些人物則和美女科學家的爆料是那麽的吻合(參見第二季終結篇)。而在第二季完成之後,我們才通過路德節目得知香港美女科學家的出逃,壹切又是那麽的巧合。

好了,給偽類進行挖掘科普的時間足夠了,那麽這張抹去了關鍵人物特征的照片的挖掘重點就在於找到美女科學家的FACEBOOK或者TWITTER的社交網絡賬號,當然壹定很難找。但是,DT挖掘機是有辦法找到的。為了尊重美女科學家,我們在沒有征得她同意前先不曝光關鍵的幾張照片,至於判斷的過程也不再出示,因為種種證據都已經證明了那個企圖殺害自己妻子的斯裏蘭卡科學家到底是誰,他是不是上面那個科學家?大家自己判斷吧。關於上面的那個科學家在學術上的挖掘我們會在後面進行的,因為他很重要!

在這裏,DT雖然不想繼續八卦,但是還是要出示壹些照片,當看到這些照片時,估計美女科學家會熱淚盈眶,我們在挖掘到這些照片時也是熱淚盈眶,心潮澎湃,從內心的感動,感激香港,感激上天給我們送來壹個拯救世界的女神,壹個對付潘多拉盒子的女神雅典娜,而她是壹個美麗、善良、真正、勇敢的中國女人,壹個青島女孩,用言語已經無法表達我們的敬意和感激之情了!上圖吧。

這是這位女神在2018年9月在加拿大舉辦婚禮上的部分照片,壹切都是那麽美好,她擁有美麗和浪漫的生活,為了揭露CCP病毒的真相,她毅然決然地舍棄了… …。

33 挖挖美女科學家的論文

關於學術論文的挖掘在戰友發表在GNEWS上的文章中已經做過,這裏之所以再做壹次挖掘是因為我們和戰友的挖掘角度不同,不是證實其真實性和女科學家的重要性(這是不需要證明的),關於這兩篇關鍵性論文和其他論文的學術解讀我們在隨後的挖掘調查文章裏會有正義科學家進行解讀,這不是本文的重點,我們還是先看看這兩篇論文:

我先看這壹篇論文:

註意帶*號的通訊作者。關於論文作者的排序解讀請參考“冠軍的親爹“的推文,在這裏不再贅述。我們依據這篇論文的內容列出全部作者名單,按照論文中的順序:

Yang Liu, Li-Meng Yan, Lagen Wan,Tian-Xin Xiang, Aiping Le,Jia-Ming Liu, Malik Peiris,*Leo L M Poon, *Wei Zhang。

再看壹篇論文:

同樣列出作者名稱,姓名後的數字為每個人在這篇論文中的排名,1 為第壹作者,1.3為並列第壹作者,2為第二作者,✉為通訊作者。

Sin Fun Sia1,3, Li-Meng Yan1,3, Alex W. H. Chin1,3, Kevin Fung2, Ka-Tim Choy1, Alvina Y. L. Wong1, Prathanporn Kaewpreedee1, Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera1, Leo L. M. Poon1, John M. Nicholls2, Malik Peiris1 & Hui-Ling Yen1 ✉。

去掉壹些信息進行簡化:Sin Fun Sia, Li-Meng Yan, Alex W. H. Chin, Kevin Fung, Ka-Tim Choy, Alvina Y. L. Wong,Prathanporn Kaewpreedee, Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera, Leo L. M. Poon, John M. Nicholls,Malik Peiris , Hui-Ling Yen

第三篇論文:

作者列出如下:

Thomas H. C. Sit1, Christopher J. Brackman1, Sin Ming Ip1, Karina W. S. Tam1, Pierra Y. T. Law1, Esther M. W. To1, Veronica Y. T. Yu1, Leslie D. Sims2, Dominic N. C. Tsang3, Daniel K. W. Chu4, Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera4, Leo L. M. Poon4 & Malik Peiris4,5 ✉

第四篇論文:

作者列出如下:

Sophie A. Valkenburg1,2*, Nancy H. L. Leung2, Maireid B. Bull1,2, Li-meng Yan2, Athena P. Y. Li1,2, Leo L. M. Poon2 and Benjamin J. Cowling2

同時註意這句話:出現了幾個關於作者來源機構的描述。

  1. HKU Pasteur Research Pole, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong,
  2. WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong

依據上述材料,我們制作出下列簡單統計表格:在表格中去掉非港大的作者。

以上列出的四篇論文中,其中三篇和CCP病毒相關,三篇作者中包括英雄科學家,經過篩選,列出的作者全部來自以下這兩個通信地址機構1 HKU Pasteur Research Pole, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, 2 WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong。在解讀這兩個通訊地址之前我們先依據以前的挖掘資料完善上面的表格,就是盡可能地列出作者的中文譯名和在HKU MED/HKU PRP兩個機構的任職,列出姓名在論文中出現的次數:我們重點考察論文次數為2次以上的作者以及通訊作者。

這張精簡的表格說明了什麽:

1、在沒有正義科學家解讀情況下說明了英雄美女科學家在相關病毒研究中的重要性。其中關鍵的壹個傳播模型的研究論文中就有她的名字。並且在研究者中同時擁有MD, PhD並不多見。在巴斯德的職員表中大多擁有PhD。而在香港大學公共衛生學院的職員中,只有Fukuda, Keiji(學院院長)這樣身份的人才同時擁有MD, MPH這樣身份,其中壹個著名的研究者管軼就是同時擁有MD, PhD身份。而Leo L. M. Poon的學術身份則是這些BSc(HKBU), MPhil(CUHK), DPhil(Oxon), FFPH (UK)。

2、根據美女科學家和路德節目以及文貴視頻直播爆料去從架構上驗證這種邏輯關系是十分精準的,其中英雄科學家和路德爆料中的Malik就是裴偉士,也就是DT在第二季中爆出的那個斯裏蘭卡人。此人已在女英雄科學家成功出逃後於七月初離職並返回斯裏蘭卡。在這裏DT釋放壹些這個裴偉士離職告別晚宴的照片,並希望他不被CCP滅口,在第三季中,關於此人的挖掘爆料還有很多資料。Leo L. M. Poon就是潘烈文。Hui-Ling Yen中文名稱為葉慧玲,Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera這個人已經從巴斯德的雇員名單上消失,當然這奇怪的斯裏蘭卡人也沒有出現在裴偉士的告別晚宴上。

3、註意這幾個人職務表述

  • Li-Meng Yan:Division of Public Health Laboratory Sciences;
  • Leo L. M. Poon:Professor and Division Head Public Health Laboratory Sciences;
  • Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera:Division of Public Health Laboratory Sciences;
  • Malik Peiris: Chair of Virology Public Health Laboratory Sciences

這些表述表明了這幾個人在實驗室工作中的領導關系,如果Li-Meng Yan在Leo L. M. Poon領導的實驗室中的話,Leo L. M. Poon則是Li-Meng Yan的領導,論文中的關系和排名位置也證明了這壹點。Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera應該在Malik Peiris的實驗室,也就是說Malik Peiris是這個實驗室的領導,而Malik Peiri還是巴斯德的真正的大領導,在第二季爆料中已經爆出他就是CCP病毒研制最重要的壹個人物之壹,也是病毒生化武器國際縱隊的研制核心人物。換句話說,英雄科學家的爆料絕對不是危言聳聽,而是血淋淋的事實真相!

4、這張表格幾乎把我們第三季挖掘中關鍵的幾個人物和幾個重要的機構都暴露出來,或者說是我們進行第三季挖掘的真正的入口,就和第二季挖掘中的選擇郭德銀作為切入點壹樣。不同的是,英雄科學家的這場揭幕之戰將會揭開P4實驗室所隱含的真正秘密。壹切又是那麽神奇。

我們在解構這幾個機構的關系之前先來看看這個著名的斯裏蘭卡人Malik(裴偉士)在離開香港巴斯德時的畫面,這個他服務了十四年的神秘的香港巴斯德研究所或許會因為他的離開揭開面紗了!

奇怪的是,在裴偉士告別晚宴上有三個關鍵的人物沒有出現,其中壹個就是他的同胞Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera,還有壹個就是我們的美女科學家,當然她不可能出現在這裏。最重要的壹個人物,也就是香港巴斯德的大領導孔祥勉的兒子孔令成(香港海洋公園董事會主席)也沒有來參加送別晚宴,這究竟意味著什麽?或許他們專門準備了壹場特殊的告別晚宴吧。

(以下為孔令成參加巴斯德集體活動照片)

4 幾個機構的關系和幾個關鍵的人物

下面我們根據這段表述來挖掘上面表格中出現的兩個機構的名稱“HKU MED”“HKU PRP”的具體含義和相關關聯。

  1. HKU Pasteur Research Pole, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong,
  2. WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong。

這兩個就是兩個單位的通訊地址,其中Pokfulam就是指香港的壹個區,薄扶林,也就是香港大學的所在地。查詢的維基百科資料如下:

薄扶林(英文:Pok Fu Lam或Pokfulam,粵拼︰bok63 fu46 lam4[註 1])位於香港島南區,是香港島的市郊部分之壹,通常指北至南區的沙灣、摩天嶺以南、南至瀑布灣的南區區域,其中薄扶林近南區部分的大部分私人屋苑(如置富花園)及別墅為香港中產階級至上層階級人士的集中地。

1860年左右,薄扶林是英國商人的夏季避暑區,山腰、山頂別墅林立,山頂有守望者房屋數間,戶外有旗桿,凡有輪船到港,守望者升旗為號。薄扶林附近有跑馬場(現址薄扶林騎徑學校),每逢孟春賽馬,仕女如雲。港督還創建壹所占地百頃的公園。而當時舊香港八景的“扶林曲徑”,便是指薄扶林道壹帶的景色。

1883年,香港第壹個水塘——薄扶林水塘落成,為香港提供自來水,泉水來自太平山,由管道引至水塘。1885年,香港牛奶公司於薄扶林村附近,即今置富花園現址,興建牧場,稱為薄扶林牧場,是香港的第壹個牧場。

1911年,香港大學在薄扶林北面成立[4],並在鄰近山麓興建行政大樓、教學大樓和大學宿舍,因而有不少大學職員和學生居住於薄扶林區。

1970年代,香港政府頒布壹項名為“薄扶林延期履行權”的行政措施,以區內交通基建設施未完善為理由,限制區內的發展,使薄扶林中低密度發展的格局維持至今。

A HKU Pasteur Research Pole,簡稱HKU PRP,中文名稱:香港大學巴斯德研究中心。

在下面這篇回憶香港大學巴斯德研究中心的合作創建者之壹孔祥勉的文章中記述了壹些歷史:

In Memorian: Dr James Ziang Mien Kung

It is with great sadness that we announce that Dr James Ziang Mien Kung, our Chairman, passed away peacefully on Sunday, May 9th, 2010 at the age of 82.

We are particularly indebted to Dr Kung for the pivotal role he played in securing a collaborative agreement in 1999 between the Institut Pasteur and the then Faculty of Medicine of the University of Hong Kong (HKU). As a result of his tireless efforts, an agreement to establish the HKU-Pasteur Research Centre (HKU-PRP) was signed that year and the Centre was inaugurated in the year 2000. Dr Kung served as convenor of the HKU-Pasteur Foundation Preparatory Committee and was Chairman of the HKU-PRP. His contribution to our Centre, the Institut Pasteur International Network and our partnership with HKU cannot be fully expressed in words.

Dr Kung was a philanthropist who supported education and the pursuit of knowledge to benefit mankind. For his active role in promoting these values in the community, he received several awards, including an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1990, an honorary Doctor of Business Administration degree in 1991 from the then Hong Kong Polytechnic, an OBE in 1994, and an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Hong Kong in 2000. He was also Honorary Patron of the HKU Foundation. He was made Grand Officer of the Order of Merit of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in 1994, and Commander in the Order of Leopold in 1997. In 2003, Dr Kung was awarded a Gold Bauhinia Star for his distinguished services to the Hong Kong community. He had strong ties with the French community in Hong Kong for many years. He was honoured in 2007 as Grand Officer dans L’Ordre National de la Légion d’Honneur. Dr James Kung will be sorely missed and warmly remembered by all those who knew him.

B WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control,簡稱WHO CCIDEC中文名稱為:世界傳染病流行病學及控制合作中心。

以下為其簡介:

Introduction

The School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine of The University of Hong Kong has been designated as a WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control since 10 December 2014. The Centre is headed by Professor Benjamin John Cowling and Dr Seto Wing-hong of the School. The designation of HKU School of Public Health as a WHO CC is the first of such kind at the University.

The HKU School of Public Health has a long and distinguished history in high impact research and public health education. With a view to protecting the public’s health in Hong Kong and across our region, the WHO CC looks forward to coordinating research on the control and prevention of infectious diseases and providing local and regional education and training in infectious disease epidemiology and control.

Terms of Reference

(1) In collaboration with WHO, further the work of Infection Prevention and Control

(2) Strengthen capacity for surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR)

(3) Emergency Response to Outbreaks of Novel Pathogens

Membership

The Centre is governed by a Steering Committee which shall direct the activity of the Centre, monitor progress on projects and deliverables in the workplan, and prepare the yearly progress report for submission to the WHO. The Steering Committee is chaired by the Centre Heads, Professor Benjamin John Cowling and Dr Seto Wing-hong, with members comprising Professor Joseph Sriyal Malik Peiris, Professor Joseph Wu, and any other members as nominated by the Heads.

The general membership of the Centre will comprise faculty members of Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, and by invitation from the Centre Heads.

C HKU SPH School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong 中文名稱香港大學公共衛生學院

History

Public health has a long established tradition at The University of Hong Kong. It was first introduced into the medical curriculum at the Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese (the forerunner of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Hong Kong), which was established by Sir Patrick Manson1, Sir James Cantlie and Sir Ho Kai in 1887. In 1891, Sun Yat-sen, one of the first students of the Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese, sat the professional examination on public health. In 1950, the Department of Social Medicine was established. In 1970, the name was changed to the Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, and to the Department of Community Medicine in 1974.

In 2004, The University of Hong Kong approved the proposal to establish a School of Public Health2, the Public Health Research Centre was established as one of the five research centres in the Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, and Master of Medical Science (Public Health) was transformed into our own postgraduate degree programme – the Master of Public Health. In 2005, the University Research Committee recognized public health as one of nineteen Strategic Research Themes for the University. In 2009, the inauguration of the School of Public Health was officiated by Professor Chen Zhu, Minister of Health for China.

In 2013, the School of Public Health formally incorporated the Department of Community Medicine and the Behavioural Sciences Unit.

In July 2016, the academic and research arms of the Institute of Human Performance were incorporated into the School of Public Health of Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine.

Heads

  • 1950-1952 TS Sze Chair, Department of Social Medicine
  • 1952-1957 KC Yeo Chair, Department of Social Medicine
  • 1957-1974 PH Teng Chair, Department of Social Medicine (1957-59)
  • Chair, Department of Social and Preventive Medicine (1959-74)
  • 1974-1980 MJ Colbourne Head, Department of Community Medicine
  • 1978-1987 J Anderson Head, Behavioural Sciences Unit
  • 1980-1987 JWL Kleevens Head, Department of Community Medicine
  • 1987-2000 AJ Hedley Head, Department of Community Medicine
  • 1987-2013 R Fielding Head, Behavioural Sciences Unit (Professor Fielding, Richard 莊日昶)
  • 2000-2012 TH Lam Head, Department of Community Medicine,(Lam, Tai Hing,)
  • Director, School of Public Health (2004-2012)
  • 2012-2013 GM Leung Head, Department of Community Medicine, Acting Director, School of Public Health
  • 2013-2017 JSM Peiris Director, School of Public Health
  • 2017- Keiji Fukuda Director, School of Public Health

歷屆院長列表

D香港大學李嘉誠醫學院 HKUMed

以下資料來自維基百科:

香港大學李嘉誠醫學院(英語:Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong,亦簡稱HKUMed),原稱香港大學醫學院,為壹所坐落於香港港島薄扶林的醫學院。其院址離香港大學本部有數公裏之遠,鄰近作為其教學及研究基地的瑪麗醫院。港大醫學院現提供醫學、中醫學、護理學、藥學及生物醫學的教育與研究項目。除中醫課程采用中英雙語教學外,所有課程均以英語作為授課語言。主要的教學醫院為位於附近的瑪麗醫院。

香港大學李嘉誠醫學院是香港最早成立的醫學院,已有逾百年歷史,時至今日香港也僅有兩所同時提供醫學及藥學專業培訓的醫學院,另壹所為1981年成立的香港中文大學醫學院。

學院的前身是創立於1887年的香港華人西醫書院,後於1907年更名為香港西醫書院,[1] 是遠東其中壹所歷史最悠久的西醫教育機構,中華民國國父孫中山曾習醫於此,為書院第壹屆畢業生,並以優異成績畢業。

1910年香港大學成立,原香港西醫書院並入香港大學成為港大本部轄下的醫學院,成為香港大學創校時成立的三大學院之壹。1912年,香港大學本部大樓落成啟用,成為醫學院主要的教學和辦公場地,醫學院當時使用西區國家醫院作為教學醫院。瑪麗醫院於1937年啟用後,成為醫學院新的教學醫院。香港日占時期,香港大學醫學院曾內遷至中國四川成都辦學。

1964年,位於瑪麗醫院附近的醫學院大樓落成,並以養和醫院創辦人李樹芬命名。

1996年,由於原有醫學院大樓(李樹芬樓,現賽馬會跨學科大樓)日漸破舊,加上附近的香港教育學院羅富國分校即將遷入新界大埔,在羅富國教育學院原址建造新醫學院綜合大樓的計劃正式立項,並於1997年11月羅師大樓騰空後正式動工。

2002年,醫學院新綜合大樓舍落成,由英國唐謀士建築師事務所設計,並由香港寶嘉建築承建[2]。同年,李樹芬樓拆卸,其後丟空至2009年後改建為賽馬會跨學科大樓,專供壹些與醫學院有合作的港大部門使用。

2006年1月1日,醫學院正式命名為“香港大學李嘉誠醫學院”。

2005年5月7日,香港大學宣布獲香港首富李嘉誠及李嘉誠基金會承諾十億港元捐款,5月18日港大建議將醫學院命名為李嘉誠醫學院以表彰李嘉誠及其基金會的慷慨捐贈,並獲港大校務委員會壹致通過。此決定曾引起醫學院舊生的關註及反對,但經咨詢後校方表示將維持原來決定,而李嘉誠亦發公開信表示“沒有改變自己的看法”。香港大學醫學院於2006年1月1日正式命名為“香港大學李嘉誠醫學院”。

反對把醫學院命名人士有香港立法會醫學界議員郭家麒,他聲言發起全球港大醫學院校友籌款,以贖回醫學院原名[3]。另壹港大醫學院校友謝鴻興亦反對命名,命名當日亦會發起抗議活動。

在李嘉誠醫學院的網站上,學院的院系設置共有如下18個院系,其中School of Public Health也就是公共衛生學院就是香港大學醫學院的壹個院系。

  1. Department of Anaesthesiology
  2. School of Biomedical Sciences
  3. School of Chinese Medicine
  4. Department of Clinical Oncology
  5. Department of Diagnostic Radiology
  6. Department of Family Medicine and Primary Care
  7. Department of Medicine
  8. Department of Microbiology
  9. School of Nursing
  10. Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology
  11. Department of Ophthalmology
  12. Department of Orthopaedics and Traumatology
  13. Department of Paediatrics and Adolescent Medicine
  14. Department of Pathology
  15. Department of Pharmacology and Pharmacy
  16. Department of Psychiatry
  17. School of Public Health
  18. Department of Surgery

我們來簡單地梳理壹下ABCD這四者之間的關系:香港大學李嘉誠醫學院 HKUMed 隸屬於香港大學,是香港大學的醫學學院,而香港大學公共衛生學院則是李嘉誠醫學院下屬的壹個院系,所以這個院系的學生習慣性稱自己為HKU Med,而其真正的名字應該為 HKU Med SPH。

而香港大學巴斯德研究中心HKUPRP和WHO CCIDEC中文名稱為:世界傳染病流行病學及控制合作中心則是香港大學和不同機構合作在香港大學李嘉誠醫學院下屬公共衛生學院設置的兩個研究中心。

事情真的這麽簡單嗎?在展開解讀之前我們先把上面的資料匯總成壹個簡單的表格,這個表格主要表述上述四個機構設立的時間。

在解讀上面的表格內容代表什麽之前我們先看看香港大學的壹個重要的P3實驗室的挖掘。

這就是“H5參考實驗室”。

我們先來看看壹些相關資料:

为了进一步说明问题,我们将為了進壹步說明問題,我們將報道的全文摘錄如下:

香港大學李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院世衛「傳染病流行病學及控制」合作中心及世衛H5參考實驗室之揭幕儀式

星期日, 16 8月 2015

香港大學(港大)李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院於上星期四(8月13日)舉行世衛「傳染病流行病學及控制」合作中心及世衛H5參考實驗室的揭幕儀式。是次承蒙世界衛生組織總幹事陳馮富珍醫生擔任主禮嘉賓並主持揭幕儀式;出席嘉賓包括衛生署署長陳漢儀醫生、漁農自然護理署署長梁肇輝博士、港大李嘉誠醫學院院長梁卓偉教授及港大李嘉誠醫學院副院長(研究)梁雪兒教授等。

自2014年12月10日起,港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院獲世衛委任為「傳染病流行病學及控制」合作中心,為期四年。合作中心由港大李嘉誠醫學院院長及公共衛生醫學講座教授梁卓偉教授,和港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院名譽臨床教授司徒永康教授領導。世衛合作中心由世衛總幹事所委任,為世衛合作網絡壹重要骨幹,以支持世衛在國與國之間、不同區域乃至全球的醫療衛生規劃,中國和香港則分別有59個及6個世衛合作中心。

港大公共衛生學院是香港大學第壹所獲世衛委任為合作中心的學術部門。梁卓偉教授衷心感謝世衛總幹事陳馮富珍醫生蒞臨港大和主禮揭幕儀式:「港大公共衛生學院壹直走在研究新發傳染病的最前端,我們期待與世衛通力合作,致力提高全球公眾健康以及控制和預防傳染病的工作。」同時,梁院長感謝衛生署署長陳漢儀醫生及漁農自然護理署署長梁肇輝博士出席揭幕典禮時道:「自二零零三年非典肺炎疫情後,港府已加強對傳染病流行病學及傳染病控制之研究及培訓;今次港大公共衛生學院獲委任成為世衛合作中心,是對港大和食物及衛生局長期合作共同守護香港以至周邊地區公共健康的嘉冕和肯定。」

另外,港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院的流感研究中心為世衛於全球共13所H5參考實驗室之壹。其宗旨主要是為促進對H5及動物傳染病之相關流感病毒之科學研究及培訓,提供國際性科研參考實驗室服務,從而向世衛提供有關動物傳染病對公共衛生威脅之風險評估,以及對有關病毒的疫苗開發之相關建議。為履行相關職責,香港大學H5 參考實驗室每年均會參予兩次世衛組織流感疫苗的篩選會議,以檢討及擬訂有關處理動物傳染病的公共衛生策略。港大公共衛生學院院長裴偉士教授及港大H5 參考實驗室聯席總監道:「憑借港大公共衛生學院多年來在動物傳染病及相關病毒而引起人類感染的研究成果,我們將繼續協助世衛,共同應對由禽流感對公共健康所帶來的威脅,並致力推動框架。」

關於世衛合作中心

世衛合作中心由世衛總幹事委任,於各大學學系、研究中心或政府部門,實行及支持有關醫療衛生的相關規劃。目前,80個會員國當中有700多所世衛合作中心,與世衛共同致力於護理、職業健康、傳染病、營養、精神健康、慢性疾病和醫療技術等領域的工作。

關於世衛H5參考實驗室

世卫于2004年成立H5参考实验室网络,为世卫对全球流感监测和应对系统之一个重要特定组织,以便协助世卫应对由禽流感(H5N1)所带来的国际公共世衛於2004年成立H5參考實驗室網絡,為世衛對全球流感監測和應對系統之壹個重要特定組織,以便協助世衛應對由禽流感(H5N1)所帶來的國際公共衛生的挑戰及醫療負擔。目前,全球共有13所實驗室被指定為世衛H5參考實驗室,而港大H5 參考實驗室為其始創成員之壹。

關於港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院

港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院在公共衛生教育及科研方面成就卓越,歷史悠久,並致力於改善人類健康。通過結合流行病學及大規模的研究室實驗,以及對非傳染病的疾病控制,學院對提升本地乃至國際的公共衛生及醫療研究發展作出重大貢獻。港大公共衛生學院為頂尖科研中心,其研究範疇包括流行性感冒、傳染病及非傳染性之慢性疾病控制、控煙、改善空氣質素、心理腫瘤學、健康服務研究、行為科學、生命歷程流行病學、醫療經濟效益、醫療服務規劃及管理等,當中不少研究更獲本地、國內以至國際組織,如世界衛生組織認同,納入其公共衛生政策當中。

((左起)港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院教授及流行病和生物統計學分部主任高本恩教授、衛生署署長陳漢儀醫生、港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院院長兼病毒學講座教授、譚華正基金教授(醫療科學)裴偉士教授、世界衛生組織總幹事陳馮富珍醫生、漁農自然護理署署長梁肇輝博士、港大李嘉誠醫學院院長兼公共衛生學院世衛「傳染病流行病學及控制」合作中心聯席總監梁卓偉教授及港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院名譽臨床教授兼公共衛生學院世衛「傳染病流行病學及控制」合作中心聯席總監司徒永康教授。

(左起)港大李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院院長兼病毒學講座教授、譚華正基金教授(醫療科學)裴偉士教授、漁農自然護理署署長梁肇輝博士、世界衛生組織總幹事陳馮富珍醫生、衛生署署長陳漢儀醫生、港大李嘉誠醫學院流感研究中心總監及公共衛生學院於崇光基金教授(病毒學)管軼教授及港大李嘉誠醫學院院長兼公共衛生學院世衛「傳染病流行病學及控制」合作中心聯席總監梁卓偉教授。

香港大學校長馬斐森教授於為陳馮富珍醫生舉辦的午宴上頒贈紀念品。

在GNEWS上有壹篇爆料文章《斯裏蘭卡的裴偉士和他的同事潘烈文》鏈接地址:https://test.gnews.org/zh-hans/194829/對這實驗室和裴偉士的資料做了壹些揭示。

世衛H5參考實驗室是在2003年SARS之後的2004年由WHO組織和成立。為世衛對全球流感監測和應對系統之壹個重要特定組織,以便協助世衛應對由禽流感(H5N1)所帶來的國際公共衛生的挑戰及醫療負擔。目前,全球共有13所實驗室被指定為世衛H5參考實驗室,而港大H5 參考實驗室為其始創成員之壹。註意這個參考實驗室不僅僅應對H5N1禽流感,而是拓展到所有的傳染病和流行病毒也就是後來推出的世衛「傳染病流行病學及控制」合作中心的核心實驗室。

換句話說“世衛H5參考實驗室”不僅僅是壹塊牌子,更是世衛組織應對全球流感等傳染病進行監測和發布全球措施的壹個重要特定組織,所謂參考就是因為世界衛生組織只是壹個發布示警和協調行動的機構,而是否發布全球的流行病毒和傳染病的警報和級別需要參考這些實驗室的監測、測試和預測的實驗結果。因為世衛組織沒有研究能力,這個過程已經在這次CCP病毒的全球擴散的過程中顯露無疑了。

好了,讓我們在上面這些資料的基礎上分析上面這張簡單的表格的背後的詭異之處,我們先簡單地按照時間線進行梳理,當然這裏面會有很多《P4實驗室第二季中的資料和內容》:

2000年,孔祥勉作為重要推動者促成法國巴斯德研究所與香港大學共建香港大學巴斯德研究中心;註意香港大學巴斯德研究中心的資金來源主要是孔祥勉執掌的巴斯德亞洲基金會。現任主席為孔祥勉的兒子孔令成。

2003年,北京爆發SARS,廣東、香港亦有感染。而在SARS研究中做出重要貢獻的袁國勇、管軼則在香港大學公共衛生學院,袁國勇不僅是香港巴斯德的負責人而且是生物系的主任,相關的挖掘可以參考第二季。

2003年,陳竺主持啟動P4實驗室建設項目。

2004年WHO創立 “世衛H5參考實驗室”正是基於中國政府和香港在抗擊SARS和香港對SARS冠狀病毒的輝煌戰果的基礎上,使得香港大學袁國勇掌控的(巴斯德也在使用)P3實驗室(流感研究中心)成為H5參考實驗室的創立者之壹,同時也奠定了香港大學公共衛生學院在WHO流行病及病毒防控和研究上的話語權。

而2004年,在上海,上海巴斯德研究所由巴斯德研究所、中國科學院與上海市政府成立,主要針對中國公眾健康的問題,集中研究傳染病,特別是病毒。上海巴斯德研究所秉承了全球巴斯德研究所的三大宗旨,包括優質研究、積極關註公眾健康和致力推動教育與培訓。

2005年,2月25日,李嘉誠基金會宣布捐款三百萬歐元(逾港幣三千萬元),資助全球頂尖研究機構法國巴斯德研究所(Institut Pasteur),與近年在禽流感及新發傳染病研究接連創出佳績的汕頭大學醫學院香港大學醫學院聯合流感研究中心的合作,為全球對抗禽流感工作的國際力量增添壹股新動力。壹個由巴斯德研究所、上海巴斯德研究所、聯合流感研究中心和李嘉誠基金會代表所組成的管理委員會將會成立,負責督導合作計劃和各項工作的推展,並監督各項工作的進展與成效。註意這種表述的管理委員會的成員,巴斯德研究所、上海巴斯德研究所、聯合流感研究中心和李嘉誠基金會,在第二季的挖掘中我們曾經揭示過,這個聯合流感研究中心管理者主要人員就是管軼或者說香港大學醫學院的團隊(也就是香港巴斯德)。

2006年李嘉誠斥資10億港幣將香港大學醫學相關機構整合成香港大學李嘉誠醫學院,同時公共衛生學院並入其中成為五大研究中心之壹。

2006年,還有壹個重要的人物出現在香港的巴斯德,這就是裴偉士。而這個裴偉士在世衛於2004年成立H5參考實驗室網絡以應對H5N1帶來的挑戰,港大H5參考實驗室是其創始成員之壹,時任WHO總幹事陳馮富珍以及Malik(裴偉士)參加了揭幕儀式。

Malik之前也曾是WHO的免疫專家戰略咨詢專家組的壹員,在WHO多個委員會中服務,並代表WHO調查在中國大陸的H7N9甲型流感和在韓國以及沙特的MERS。

他同時也是美國國立衛生研究院NIAID流感監測與研究中心(CEIRS)計劃的研究員,該計劃旨在應對流感大流行的威脅。NIAID現在的主管是Fauci博士。

他還是《柳葉刀傳染病》的編委。

1981年,他在英國獲得D.Phil學位,他的學位論文的壹個主要方面就是,抗體可能在促進而不是阻止病毒進入巨噬細胞中發揮了自相矛盾的作用。

1995年,他在香港大學下屬的瑪麗醫院建立了臨床和公共衛生病毒學的實驗室。

1997年,香港首次爆發人類H5N1禽流感病毒,Peiris教授的實驗室研究關註到了“細胞因子風暴”,它被認為是禽流感病毒發病機理的主要機制。

2003年,他的實驗室分離出了SARS的病原體,6月份,他的實驗室及其合作者已經使用實時PCR來診斷SARS。這個時候裴偉士在香港大學下屬的瑪麗醫院。

也就是在2006年瑪麗醫院因香港大學李嘉誠醫學院的成立並入香港大學李嘉誠醫學院後這個裴偉士開始任職香港大學巴斯德研究中心。

這個時間線加上香港大學李嘉誠醫學院公共衛生學院院長的任命更加說明壹些問題:

  • Lam, Tai Hing 林大慶 2009-2013
  • GM Leung 梁卓偉2012-2013
  • JSM Peiris 裴偉士2013-2017
  • Keiji Fukuda 福田敬二 2017-

在這個院長名單中,有三人包括林大慶、裴偉士、福田敬二具有WHO官員經歷和背景,換句話說在WHO中具有相當大的影響力。而梁卓偉、裴偉士則是研究冠狀病毒的專家。

這壹切難道是巧合嗎?

挖掘到這裏,我們有充分的理由和邏輯相信,CCP對WHO的掌控布局自從2003年SARS爆發之時就已經開始,這是壹個驚天的大布局,其控制的核心就是香港大學的公共衛生學院。而揭開中共展控下WHO的真實面具正是第三季挖掘的壹個內容,可以肯定說,WHO是CCP豢養的壹條惡犬,在CCP針對美國和全球使用擴散生化病毒武器這場戰爭中,它成了可恥的幫兇。

在這裏,首先提醒壹下,不要忘了三個關鍵人物梁卓偉、裴偉士、福田敬二的美國經歷和背景,其中福田敬二還是壹個真正的美國人。

5 關鍵的壹張照片:

在本文的最後,我們出示壹張和美女英雄科學家相關的壹張關鍵的照片。

2019年1月21日,我們的英雄科學家在其工作單位香港大學公共衛生學院負責接待了壹位著名的美國學者專家,並拍攝了這張照片:

照片標題:

2019 1.21. Our MPH students had the privilege to meet Prof Barry Bloom from Harvard in an exclusive sharing session. Prof Barry Bloom has been a pioneer in infectious disease research and vaccine science and was Dean of Harvard School of Public Health from 1999 to 2009. He spent over 35 years as principal investigator researching the immune response to tuberculosis in his Harvard lab and his scientific contributions have made him a trusted adviser in public health policy worldwide. We thank Prof Bloom for his generous sharing with our students.

這位著名的Barry Bloom教授在2020年的3月19日在美國的媒體上發表了壹份針對CCP病毒的訪談,全文內容我們摘錄如下:

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Press Conference with Barry Bloom, 03/19/20

Transcript

You’re listening to a press conference from the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health featuring Barry Bloom, professor of immunology and infectious diseases and former dean of the school. This call was recorded at 2:30 pm Eastern Time on Thursday, March 19.

BARRY BLOOM : Greetings, everyone. My name is Barry Bloom. I’m a professor and the former dean of the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health. My long-term scientific interest has been global health. My field is immunology of infectious diseases. I’m pleased to be on this call.

Perhaps I have a somewhat unusual perspective, in that I had been invited with a colleague after SARS erupted and China failed to address it adequately. In 2003, was invited by the ministry of health to give advice on what they could have done better. And those lessons have carried through to the present time and seeing the current spread of the new coronavirus around the world and things that every country has to do to be prepared.

So I would look forward to trying to answer your questions. I state in advance there still remains an awful lot uncertain in the scientific world. But I’ll do my very best to be helpful.

OPERATOR : And at this time, are we wanting to open the floor for questions? We’ll take our first question in the queue.

Q: Hi, Barry.Quick question on the statistics out of China this morning where they’re showing no new cases in Wuhan or the surrounding province. Do you have any reason to doubt those numbers? I mean, is the decline we’re seeing in China real? And do you have a sense that sort of gives us hope as to a way forward?

BARRY BLOOM: It’s a very important and very good question. I think many of us weeks ago were very skeptical of numbers coming out of China, not that we knew they weren’t correct. But with the interest in keeping the bad news as minimal as possible, one didn’t know to what extent one could trust the numbers.

We had a symposium at the School of Public Health last, I think, Friday. And had videoed in the dean of the medical school at Hong Kong, a former Takemi Fellow and Harvard School of Public Health graduate, who has been the major advisor, both to the government of Hong Kong and a major advisor to the government of China, and also a member of the commission, the WHO commission in China. And having expressed his earlier skepticism was quite confident the numbers we had been getting as of a week ago for at least several weeks prior to that have been quite accurate and were checked and examined carefully by the WHO independent group. So, I’m inclined to believe that if they say there are no cases over a 24-hour period, they’re probably telling it right.

Q: And what are the implications of that? Is that a model that we here in the US can follow?

BARRY BLOOM: Well, the dramatic effect in China was to allow the epidemic to get ahead of the ability to respond in a public health way, which is the problem that occurs in all epidemics– in most epidemics. And since the epidemic doubles every week, if you start with 100 cases, in seven weeks you have 65,000 cases. That’s hard for people to understand.

But the answer is, here it was clear they knew in late November or early December. But only on the 31st did the world know they had an infectious disease problem. So, I would think from there on they’ve had to introduce very stringent suppression measures of keeping people from leaving their homes and dealing with social interactions.

The point here being, it worked. The numbers, ultimately, came down. People were enormously inconvenienced. An awful lot of people got sick and died. But the numbers have come down.

There are two questions that arise from your question. The one is, will it stay down? And no one knows. And China, I think, has been lifting the ability of people to go to work restraint. And if it is done gradually and slowly, it is, I think, most likely it will be– there will be bursts of outbreaks, but they will be controllable.

Q: Thank you.

OPERATOR : We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Yes, thank you. I have two questions about the fine points of symptoms. And I know these are not easy to tackle. But there’s a lot of concern out there. So we can shed a little bit of light. If a person feels chest tightness, how can they distinguish that from the COVID-19 symptom of difficulty breathing, versus maybe just being a sign of stress that a lot of us are feeling now? And secondly, if you have a runny nose or some sniffles, should they not worry at all?

BARRY BLOOM: [LAUGHS] Well, let me just establish my credentials. I am not a physician. I’m a researcher and a PhD. So, what I say should be taken with a grain of salt.

But having looked at the case descriptions, both from China and from the first cases written up in the US, a runny nose is not characteristic of this infection. Tightness of the chest, the kind of things that you would expect with stress, is not a characteristic symptom. But really difficulty breathing, heavy breathing, not feeling you’re getting enough air in and oxygen is a sign that really you need to see or consult someone in medicine.

This is concurrent with a flu epidemic which we are taking for granted every year that kills an awful lot of people and makes an awful lot sick. So, the challenge is, can one simply by clinical symptoms distinguish the new coronavirus infection from influenza? And my colleagues say that’s very different clinically. And that’s why we need testing, testing, testing.

Q: Thank you.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Thank you very much for doing this call. I had a couple of questions. One is that we’ve seen different estimates of mortality rates around the world for this disease. And the most recent one, I think, was a preprint and then a paper in Nature, I think, today saying that the mortality rate in China was 1.4%, which is lower than previous estimates.

So, I wanted to ask you, first of all, what you think of that– how 1.4% sounds to you as a possible mortality rate for China and for the world overall. And generally, how long do you think it’s going to be until we really understand what the death rate is?

BARRY BLOOM: So, I may sound like a broken record that you’ve heard before. But the case fatality rate depends on two things, one of which is pretty easy to figure out, which is how many people die. In some places, it’s not always clear whether they die of this infection, or influenza, or something else. So, there’s a certain amount of uncertainty about just counting people who die in a given region in the middle of an epidemic.

The second, and much more difficult, is the rate depends on how many people of those infected actually die. And we have figures from China. And I think everyone would agree that not everybody was tested. So, we actually don’t know what the denominator is. And the more people who get tested, usually, the lower the case fatality rate is.

So, if you remember H1N1 in Mexico, the initial reports– case fatality rate were 5% to 10%. And that was mostly because they were looking at people who were sick, very sick, and in hospitals. But as the epidemiology played out retrospectively and one tackled how many people had any medical problem that could be related to an infection with flu, it went down to 0.07%.

So, the case fatality rate really depends on knowing the denominator. And without testing a very wide range of people, both symptomatic and asymptomatic, we tend always to get a higher number, which is the most frightening number. For the modeling studies, people that I’ve looked at– I’m modeling at about 1%. And it may drop down quite dramatically if we actually knew how many people were infected and not sick at all.

Q: Thank you very much. I wonder if I could ask you another question sort of following up on something you said a little bit earlier about, there would be bursts of outbreaks. I sort of wonder how you see things playing out globally. I mean, we’ve got many areas of this country and the world kind of locked down or semi-locked down. And until we have either an adequate treatment or a vaccine we’re going to risk– assuming that the virus is not going to be eliminated at this point, what do you think will have to be done until that point?

I mean, if you take your foot off the gas and let people go back to work and run around and mill around, and you have possible outbreaks, you may start more spread, even around the world. So, what do you see happening or having to be done until we’ve reached the point where we really can stop it and prevent it?

BARRY BLOOM: I think you’ve asked a key question. And this is different from many other epidemics, not least because this is a really virulent strain of coronavirus. And it is one that we have had no prior experience to. So as bad as flu is, flu comes around every year. More or less everybody has had a flu at some time and has some immunological imprints that may help us make a response, that may not keep us totally from being sick, but at least protects us to some degree every year against flu. We are totally naive to this infectious disease.

And the only way to become protected is either to be vaccinated– and we have no vaccine– or to have become infected and hope that even a low-level infection will generate a protective immune response. And we will be protected for some period of time. So, we’re in the first round, since nobody has been protected against this in the past, of being a globally highly susceptible population. And the question really is– and for this, China has been the laboratory for understanding this disease– what happens as they gradually reduce the restraints on people working, going back to the factories, moving around within cities, and moving out of Hubei and around other parts of China?

So, we know there are– while there were 60,000 cases in Wuhan, places like Guangzhou and Shanghai that had people that had, previous to that, come into their towns with infections, were able to keep the numbers down to the hundreds. So, knowing what’s coming and moving quickly– speed is of the essence. Getting the tools which we, regrettably, don’t still have in the states– to identify everybody and test their contacts. We have the potential– perhaps not as draconian as shutting down the entire province in China of 60 million people. But we have the potential as was done in Korea, for example, of having huge amounts of testing, finding who’s positive, even if they’re not sick, and isolating them. Because even if you’re not sick, if you’re infected and transmit, everybody’s going to transmit between 2 and 2.5 new people. And that number continues exponentially to double.

So, the answer is we would know better what to expect if we actually knew how many people in this country and in each region was infected. And the question is, how long can we sustain being tightly constrained as we are in the States, with the proviso that is really hard for people, and certainly me, to understand– every state sets its own rules, not the federal government. So, if Boston is closed down in Massachusetts, someone in Wheeling, West Virginia doesn’t have to be. And we’re going to have a great difficulty in predicting for the country what happens.

And that leads to the final long-winded answer to your question. China’s biggest problem right now is importing cases that are flying in from other countries. They’ve really done a job at bringing their own epidemic to low level. They’re, I believe, expecting there will be bursts of outbreaks. But they’re going to be getting new imports from people who are healthy when they get on the plane, and two or three days later turn out to have this virus. I think they’re tooled up to deal with that.

But within the United States, if there are outbreaks we are not currently unable to move by car or truck or plane to any other part of the country. We will have to put out many fires– hopefully small– once we have enough of the diagnostic tools to be able to know who has this infection and whom not.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Hi, thanks for doing this call. Can you speak a little bit about seasonality. What are the chances– I know this is brand new. But what are the chances that this coronavirus will act like other ones and transmission might dissipate a bit in the summer months? And what does that mean for the health system in terms of potentially buying time for doctors and hospitals to catch up? Thanks.

BARRY BLOOM: It, too, is a wonderful question. And the answer is nobody knows for sure. I think that’s a clear cut and certain answer. Nobody knows how this particular viral strain will respond.

There are some studies in comparisons of the infection in northern China versus Hong Kong, although it’s wintertime there as well. And there doesn’t seem to be a huge temperature and humidity change between those two parts. But that’s probably not fair, because it’s all wintertime. We know from massive studies of influenza, it doesn’t do well in high humidity and high heat. We also know people tend to be walking around outdoors more in the summertime than in the wintertime, and how to factor all of those into what could be predicted.

And then, finally, I think our epidemiologists tend to believe that we overrate the effect of summertime and warm weather on SARS in 2003. We forget the massive public health efforts that were used to test people in Canada and in many countries around the world that really put major public health pressures against spread of the virus. It wasn’t just temperature.

So, if I had to guess, it is, from what I read from the pre-publications, likely to go down a bit, because it doesn’t like high humidity and temperature, likely not to go away, and likely to come back at some level as we spread this out, possibly as the weather cools in the fall. But nobody really knows.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Hi. Thank you for doing the call. And thank you for taking my question. There’s been a lot of discussion about how younger people are sort of being dismissive of the social distancing requirements or requests that have been put in place in many places. Yesterday, the CDC released some numbers suggesting that as many as one in five younger adults end up being sick enough to be hospitalized as a result of the coronavirus. And also, obviously, they could transmit it to older adults as well. So, I’m wondering if you could just comment on the general risk to younger adults and also why it’s important for them to comply with social distancing and other public health steps in order to prevent transmission. Thank you.

BARRY BLOOM: Again, a wonderful question. I saw the CDC report this morning. And it’s troubling at a couple levels in terms of formulating an intelligible answer. Under-20s were a very low percentage in China of people that had severe infection. And appears to be the same in Italy. And the question, then, is why it would be so high in the United States when it wasn’t seen in countries that had, at the moment, a probably greater level of infection.

I don’t know the answer. I don’t know of anyone yet who does. I’m sure CDC is looking at it. But it may also have to do with the criteria for admission to a hospital. We are much more likely to have people taken to a hospital for symptoms that are not overwhelmingly serious than in the middle of an epidemic where screening in so-called– let’s say in Shanghai, or Korea, or China, where they have special hospitals with people with fevers or possible symptoms that prevented them from getting into a hospital that had to provide acute respiratory care.

So, it may be partially deciding on who has to go to a hospital in the US that would go to a fever clinic or some other facility elsewhere, such that the numbers are not suggestive that one in five of all adolescents are likely to get serious respiratory infections. One doesn’t know. I can’t think of a biological or medical reason.

Having said that, the answer to your question is if 20-year-olds believe– in China, Italy, Korea, or here– they’re invulnerable to this infection, we know that there are 20-year-olds who’ve died in every one of those places. And they are not invulnerable any more than anyone else to this infection.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Thank you. I’d like to ask a sort of provincial Massachusetts question. So, we heard from Governor Charlie Baker today that they think they can do 3,500 tests a day starting early next week. And it feels like there is this kind of race going on between– can we ramp up our testing, and get enough protective equipment out there, and get people distanced enough so that the virus will go blooey here. Or will we not– as Governor Baker said, he’s trying to get ahead enough so that he can be proactive enough to head off the virus.

How are you seeing this picture, this race now, at this point? And what are the prospects?

BARRY BLOOM: I think we’re behind the curve. And if the major hospitals in Boston who’ve been begging for tests for the last three weeks or longer haven’t been able to test, we have no idea what’s going on in this state. The tests will begin. They will be hopefully aggregated, so we’ll know on a daily basis how big that curve goes. It will not be particularly epidemiologically meaningful, because we’ll be measuring what we can test for, not what’s really out there.

So, it’ll take a while before we can get systematic testing, which should be– if you want to draw the curve how bad things are, you want to know, how many people are today getting their first infection? How many people today are getting their first admission to a hospital? Those are figures that will let us think about how things are going.

So again, I take Korea as the best case, but also Singapore and Hong Kong. When they had a few dozen cases, they were testing everybody they found– all but eight contacts in the whole place of Singapore. That’s extraordinary it could be done. But they were testing vast numbers of people, not just those in acute respiratory distress, but anybody that they thought would be a contact.

And we’re in a position of hoping to have enough tests to know whether someone with acute respiratory symptoms has flu or has the new coronavirus. And we won’t get a sense of how many people are walking around able to transmit it until we have more drive-through test facilities and more people who can identify cases and contacts and have them self-quarantined.

So, we’re behind the curve. And the numbers may go up quickly. They may be scary. But in fact, we’re measuring what’s already been there for several weeks, not what we need to know, which is whether the curve is bending or not.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue. Please go ahead.

Q: Hi, Dr. Bloom. Thank you so much for doing this talk. You mentioned earlier that your area of expertise is more research and not medical. And one of my questions mainly medical, but I’ll ask it anyway to see if you have a take on it. But a lot of our readers are asking us about ibuprofen and anti-inflammatory medications, and that it increases the risk of complications in those infected with the virus. Do you have a take on that? And particularly, what is it about these medications that is of any concern in the medical community?

BARRY BLOOM: I really can’t answer that. I’ve seen the reports on both sides of the ibuprofen. You know, they’re not cures of anything. So, in terms of affecting the course of the infection in general, they’re not going to make much of a difference. I think the common drug that people are now interested in doing a systematic testing of is the hydroxychloroquine, which has shown in SARS and MERS some beneficial effects. And any beneficial effect without severe side effects is better than doing nothing.

My big hope, to answer an earlier question that is related to yours, is it’s going to take a year to a year and a half at the earliest before we know whether the vaccines that are being tested are likely to be safe. And that’s a non-trivial question, because vaccines go into healthy people. Drugs go into sick people. So, you have a little bit more of a cost-benefit difference. We can’t make healthy people sick with a vaccine that hasn’t been shown to be safe. And that’s the reason vaccines will take so long.

There are some new drugs. There are lots of people working on this, repurposed drugs that have been approved for other purposes– remdesivir that seemed to work on one case of MERS. I would think that’s the quickest thing that could prevent people from the severest outcomes of the disease. But we know that transmission, or the number of viral particles, is greater at the earliest stage of disease. And the later stages of disease probably occur when the immune response is fighting the virus and lessening the number of particles, but also ravaging the body with an overreaction to the virus and the antigens that they release.

So, the immune system is complicated. And something that prevents people from being severely ill or dying is wonderful– unlikely to affect the outcome of the epidemic, unless it could be used very early on.

OPERATOR: Our next question. Please go ahead.

Q: Barry, thanks for doing this. It’s really helpful. I want to go fact screen. You mentioned at the very beginning that you, in fact, had met with the minister of health in China after SARS to discuss what they could have done better. At that point in time, they had temporarily shut down their wildlife markets. They did that temporarily in February 2020. And then they banned it.

My specific question is, when you talked to them back in 2003, did they talk about the policy of shutting down any of the wildlife markets?

BARRY BLOOM: They knew that they were a possible source of transmission. They knew that they had to shut them down for a period of time. And my understanding is both with changes of health personnel in the ministry and many revisions to the political system since then– the live markets are seen as something part of a cultural tradition and politically difficult to make go away. Everybody that I know of for many years has been saying they’re enormously dangerous for transmission of zoonoses from one animal to another animal species, and also into transmission into humans.

I don’t know why they haven’t shut them down permanently. It’s the same issue with people proposing to reduce the coal industry in the United States. It’s part of a cultural tradition that’s very hard to deal with by orders from on high.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question. Please go ahead.

Q: Hi, thank you so much for this. Looking at this week’s Imperial College London report, it suggests that the best strategy is interventions aimed at suppression. That includes social distancing and K quarantine, household quarantine. But the model predicts that even if you have effective suppression, it’s going to be followed by a big spike in cases in the fall.

I know we’ve touched on this a little bit. It offers the suggestion that intermittent social distancing is one way to deal with that. So, I want to sort of come back to this possibility of cases rising again in the fall. Can you talk about the danger of a spike happening, even if we do have successful suppression of the spread? And do you think that they’re suggestion that intermittent social distancing is something that could work to help flatten, I guess, the secondary curve at this point.

BARRY BLOOM: It’s a profoundly important question. And let me just emphasize that no one really knows that this virus will survive the summer and come back in the fall. In the beginning, the analogy was made with influenza that goes away in the fall. SARS went away in the fall. Maybe this will go away in the fall.

There is no evidential basis for that. So, everybody, including the model makers, are speculating. But they are awfully thoughtful in how they have thought about their models.

The problem is that no one other than those who’ve recovered from infection are likely to be immune. Which means that if it does persist in the fall, if it’s reintroduced, even if we could get rid of it by the summer, and new cases are occurring elsewhere in the world in travelers who come back to the States or visit the States, there is always going to be a possibility of continued bursts and outbreaks in the fall.

And the question then, do you have to deal with them– how do you deal with them? And I think the sense, as the New York Times editorial by Zeke Emanuel and his colleagues said today, it’s like going downhill on a snowy, icy road. If you put your foot on the brakes, you will crash. If you don’t put your foot on the brakes, you will crash. So, what one does is pump the brake in a kind of responsive way to see where you are at the current time.

I think that’s the model that the Imperial Group is saying. If it comes back, it will come back at a lower level than it started, because not everybody will be susceptible. And if you have to clamp it down for a bit and you have testing to see how extensive the number of sensitive people are to become infected, you’ll have a guideline and something to measure whether things are getting from the 100 level to the 1,000 level, from the 1,000 level to the 5,000 level. And you have to introduce different constraints or suppression measures, depending on how easy it is to find a few contacts in one town in Minnesota. Or you have to shut down a whole state that seems to be problematic, or reduce contacts in other ways.

So, I think the key to every decision making in policy depends on testing and having really smart people model the course of the epidemic in real time, not just by analogy to China.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Hi. Thanks for taking my question. I guess it’s kind of two parts. One, how long do you think the sorts of social distancing measures that are in place now in the US will have to be in place to prevent a surge in cases that overwhelm our health care capacity? And if we’re sort of successful in the interim, do you think that it’s possible that we could go back to a time where all we really needed to keep outbreaks from spreading is sort of widespread testing, and then isolating cases as they pop up, and tracing their contacts and isolating those? Sort of until we get a vaccine.

BARRY BLOOM: So, I believe that maintaining every level of social or personal distancing that was outlined in the Imperial College model has to be done. It starts with voluntary quarantine for anybody who thinks they may have symptoms, whether they have this or not. It means social distancing of those people who are over 70. But because of this fragmented health system in the US, every state is going to do something differently. So, making generalizations about the United States in this context becomes really very difficult.

Assuming we could have a systematic imposition of all of the above and that the leakage rate is something like 25%– that is, it’s 75% effective– the sense is that they could really turn the curve down by two or three months. It won’t go away. China didn’t go away once they turned the curve down. But that might be the time that we could release some of the constraints on people, so they could resume more normal lives.

In Korea, people still went to work. They had to get certain permissions. They had to get tested at certain checkpoints. People were removed from their households to be in fever hospitals. There are lots of ways to try to contain the people who might be ill and allow others the opportunity to go to work. And of course, everybody in China and Korea wears a mask, even before this.

I think there’s much that we could be doing during these three months that would help bend the curve to the point where, as everybody says, we protect the hospital system. I’m hopeful we could actually do more than that, to the extent that a lot of what needs to be constrained can be loosened by the fall– expecting there will be outbreaks in various places, but being prepared with testing, large numbers of people able to do contact tracing, which we don’t now have with cuts at CDC over the past many years– we can tool up to find cases if the numbers are low.

But to be absolutely honest, as I said at the beginning, models are not predictions. And nobody really knows for sure how long it would take to really lower the curve that we could live in a tolerable way, and how much can be released of all of those constraints– schools, social distancing whole populations, protecting people of 70 years of age, isolating anybody with a fever from their contacts. How long we can do that is unclear. And I think that’s a political question and a kind of solidarity question that we haven’t been tested in since the Second World War.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Thank you so much for taking the question. It actually goes along with what you were just saying. We hear a lot about contact tracing here in Florida and what they’re doing with those efforts. But as we’ve reported in the Herald, testing is still really a challenge. We’re only testing the most severe cases, the most symptomatic people, or those with known ties to travel. So, my question is, how effective can contact tracing be without that kind of widespread testing?

BARRY BLOOM: I think you’ve answered the question. Contact tracing can only work if you find, essentially, every contact. So, I would contrast, for example, at the same time, what was happening in 60,000 people being infected. And in another part of China, 200 people were infected. Guangzhou or Hong Kong or Singapore.

And the difference is once they knew what was coming, and once they had developed a diagnostic test, it works really well when you have a limited number of contacts and you can identify all of them. Once the numbers exceed the number of public health people that can find them or the number of tests you can do, it’s very difficult to work by containment of known contacts or infected. You’re working at social population level mitigation, which is locking everybody down to avoid social distancing at every level possible. So, testing really can be done best when you know what the problem is and you have enough tests for everybody.

Let me just say that we’re using a challenging molecular test that has to be done by qualified people in high tech machines to get the answer at the present time. There are tests being developed– in China, they are developed– where with a stick drive, anybody in their house could look to see whether they have been infected with the coronavirus. It will not be 100% sensitive. It will not be 100% accurate. But boy, I would really like to have a test that I could look at tomorrow and ask whether I am likely to have been infected and then could report that somewhere. And we could get everybody’s answer in without having to wait in lines and drive-through things.

So, the science is moving to the point where we can do that, not necessarily testing for the virus, but for example, testing the immune response to the virus, which starts as soon as you are infected. And a week later, whether you’re sick or not sick, you will probably have an antibody that– we know how to do very quick antibody tests for HIV and many other diseases. And they could be made household tests as we do with pregnancy and other things.

It is how to move what we know how to do in a laboratory to a commercial area where people can get– on their own, be empowered to do their own testing. That would be the ideal for me. And that’s not going to be tomorrow in the United States.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Thanks for taking my call. I’m seeing a few things having to do with transmission and whether the virus moves more through the air or is spreading more on surfaces. I wonder what you can tell us about what scientists have figured out on that and what it means for public health recommendations.

BARRY BLOOM: A wonderful question.

To answer your question, that was published– we can go in the New England Journal paper where scientists actually did experiments to measure, if you put so many viral particles down on cardboard, or copper, or plastic, or steel, how long can you find viable viruses there? And the answer is– how much stays in the air? And the answer is a matter of minutes to hours. About 35 or 40 minutes you lose half of the viability. So, this is an exponential decay. It’s not a straight line. It’s a half-life.

And so, in that context, it’s hours in the air if you’re in the same room with somebody. If it’s on a surface, it can be up to 27 hours as a common number of how far they carried out the test and find some level of virus, but much lower that was put down. Cardboard did better in terms of reducing the time the virus remained viable, for reasons that, at least, those authors had no idea, nor do I. We know that viruses in general like flu don’t survive well on fabric, clothes, as they would in surfaces that are hard.

But we’re talking about the persistence in some places for a matter of days on surfaces, which means disinfection is something that should be done at a minimum, in places like factories where there is lots of surface contact of goods and things, as often as possible.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Hi, Barry. I have a general immunology question. We’ve been reading about NBA players who are infected but don’t have any symptoms. And then other people who become very, very ill. Is this an unusual characteristic of COVID-19? Or is this typical of any disease?

BARRY BLOOM: I don’t think it’s typical of any disease. But I think there is a gradation in respiratory diseases. For example, in my favorite disease, tuberculosis, something like 2/3 of the world’s population, perhaps, has been infected with the bug that causes of TB. Either they cure it, or it remains latent, and they’re not sick ever. But at some point, some of them, particularly, with may become immunosuppressed either by chemotherapy, or by HIV, or their immune system wanes in old age, when their immune system shuts down– your ability to control a persisting infection goes down. So, in this context, it isn’t terribly surprising there’s a huge gradation.

In one of the key questions, which is an immunologic question is, is there any way to predict anyone who comes into a fever hospital, or a clinic, or a hospital for testing, can you sort who’s going to get really sick and develop a cytokine storm and be life threatening, and who is just going to have a bad case of this viral infection and recover after 10 days? And the answer is, we have no test for that. There is a hint that there might be certain cytokines that– looking at China data, one unpublished archived paper preprint suggests there might be such a thing. And I learned that there are investigators at Harvard hospitals that are interested in pursuing that.

And that would be very helpful for hospitals to know who’s going to get sick, but isn’t going to need a ventilator, or respirator, or extracorporeal oxygen treatment. That would free up some of the major hospital interventions that we’re worried about running out of. Research to be done.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Thank you, Barry. What would you tell providers in the community– physicians and nurse practitioners– who are not in the acute care setting? What roles are they playing in this pandemic? And what can we tell them to help them help their patients?

BARRY BLOOM: I think the first priority I would have is how they can protect themselves. And this is where testing is so terribly important. It’s one thing to know how to deal with a patient that you know has been infected and might be at a risk. And you would take certain precautionary steps in dealing with them. But if you’re a school nurse and you have no idea whether your kids who are healthy are able to transmit the virus to you, or if you’re a nurse in a hospital worrying whether you’re in a position to transfer the nurse to your kids, those are serious questions that really worry the hell out of me.

And the protective tools that we have available to people at the second line– the high school nurses and practical nurses and home nurses– they’re not there yet. And it would be really helpful if everybody knew who was carrying the virus for 10 days and stayed up and had to go somewhere. Tell someone that you’re in contact with, I might have this virus. Please protect yourself. That would be ideal. But for that, we really need testing, personal protective equipment, and masks.

And I would start with masks. I’m not the biggest fan in masks, but there are a few scientific experiments that I can’t dismiss that suggest that surgical masks are not all that bad. And in fact, in some studies, two studies, in hospitals, in seven medical centers, they were essentially as good as N-95 masks. I wouldn’t count on that. But it’s better than nothing. And in this case, anything that would protect the frontline people strikes me as something they try to utilize.

OPERATOR: Next question. Please go ahead.

Q: Hi, Professor Bloom. Can you talk a little bit about the recent government directives concerning nonessential surgery? How nonessential is being defined, who’s defining it. Is this something that’s being determined on a case by case basis?

BARRY BLOOM: It’s a terribly [LAUGHS] important question to which I don’t have a very good answer. My sense from the infectious disease people who are not surgeons, obviously, is that there is no general guideline that the federal government has put out as deciding what is essential and what is nonessential. Hospitals are being left, as I understand it, at least in most states, to decide on their own. And I have heard there’s a clamoring in the network of scientific communication.

Every hospital, not least for liability purposes, but for real life purposes, would like guidelines on how to tell people who have a pain here and an appointment to look at their annual melanoma reading– to tell them what’s essential and what’s not. And we don’t have those guidelines that I’m aware of.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Hey, doctor. Thanks for having this chat. My question is more to do with public health and panic buying. Here in Ohio and across the country, we’re seeing a surge in sales from everything from food, to hand sanitizer, and even guns and ammunition. From a public health standpoint, what are the concerns with panic buying?

BARRY BLOOM: They make things worse. That’s the best that I can say. Because the most mobile, affluent, healthy people are the ones who are able to do the panic buying. And the most vulnerable, those in the elderly population, those not quite so mobile, those that don’t own cars, are the most vulnerable. And this is a question that, really– I heard the president’s speech yesterday and the comments that didn’t include this today. This is where citizenship really counts. This is where solidarity of– we’re all in this together and having 10 more rolls of toilet paper or disinfectant in my household isn’t going to make anybody any safer. But it’s going to put other people at risk.

And until we can get people to really think about, yes, protect you and your family first. But you don’t have to buy off the store in every cereal. I can’t get cereal in my local market. This is a matter of my view of what citizenship is about. And protecting everybody, not just yourself, is what being a good citizen is.

And I know it sounds platitudinous. But that’s the spirit that I have heard from colleagues in Korea and after the fact in China. There’s less complaining than you would imagine about social distancing. Because there is this sense that what I spare for myself may make available to somebody else. We need that spirit. And we need leaders that every level, not just political and government, but entertainment, and medicine, and elsewhere, to encourage people to be good citizens.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Barry, I want to go back to the wet markets for a second. Do you think for the infectious disease researchers worldwide, knowing what they know about the wet markets, should join forces and call for the shutting down of all the wet markets across Southeast Asia and China? Because the health risks are there. People know about it.

BARRY BLOOM: Oh, people do know about it. And they’ve known about it for a very long time. I would direct the question at a different level. I’m not sure the government of China is going to listen to a bunch of public health people who write a petition. I think they would have to listen to the World Health Organization. And I am not aware– I’m not that in touch with what’s going on at the moment at WHO– I am not aware that that’s been a major thrust to get WHO to take a position on it.

WHO doesn’t like to take a position that is targeted to individual countries. And since there are countries in Africa that do have open markets and sell things like non-human primates for food, bushmeat, in essence, it is possible that in this occasion without directly targeting it to China they could get the World Health Assembly to pass a resolution. And I’d love to see the United States of America government, which is represented there, to support such a resolution.

We should not have open markets where species of different animals are in constant contact with one another. It’s too great a hazard to the whole world to allow that cultural tradition to continue.

OPERATOR: This concludes the question and answer session. I will now turn it back over to Dr. Bloom for any closing remarks.

BARRY BLOOM: I am most appreciative of the thoughtfulness of the questions and, obviously, the knowledge of the people who asked them, particularly in the press. I hope the answers were helpful. And I am hopeful that this series of broadcasts from the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health will continue to be helpful to you in your work at informing America of how we can respond to this epidemic. Thank you all for your input.

This concludes the Thursday, March 19 press conference.

註意這篇對話錄的發布時間是2020年的3月,這個時間點,曾經與他合影的英雄科學家早已成功登陸美國。

那麽這個著名的教授是誰,我們來看看:

當然令人吃驚的是他還有另外壹個身份:“哈佛大學中國基金”指導委員會的重要成員,有沒有震驚到?怎麽繞到哈佛大學身上了?壹切又是這麽神奇。

所以,如果美國的FBI或者記者質疑美女英雄科學家的爆料內容的真實性可以不用遠赴香港去查證了,直接詢問這位著名的生物病毒學家就可以了,閆夢麗是否是香港大學公共衛生學院的職員,所從事的研究是否重要,對CCP病毒的指控和披露是否真實,去詢問這位專家就可以了。

關於這個“哈佛大學中國基金”的挖掘故事還有很多,我們將在第三季中專門通過壹篇文章進行系統挖掘和解讀,當然,這個基金壹定和P4實驗室產生某種聯系。在這裏只小小的爆壹個小料:

2016年這個基金會在哈佛大學商學院組織了壹場轟動全人類的講演,講演的嘉賓就是時任海航董事長兼創始人陳鋒先生!

以下為視頻鏈接地址:https://youtu.be/MH9m6pAEHcI

DT挖掘機真心的希望美國人認真研究壹下這個視頻,因為陳鋒這個渾身充滿CCP醜惡基因的所謂大人物針對美國人的這次講演基本代表了CCP對待美國和美國人的基本態度和認知水平。

6 一切已經開始。

我們把這壹季的總序言放在最後,並以這篇序幕性的挖掘文章再次致敬我們的美女英雄科學家。

《P4實驗室系列 第三季》總序言

DT挖掘戰隊的《P4實驗室系列 第二季》十壹篇挖掘調查文章已經推出。在此,DT挖掘機首先感謝正義科學家們的參與和解讀,沒有他們的參與和耐心解讀,DT不會理解那些抽象的名詞和隱藏在科技技術之後的真相和秘密。同時感謝參與第二季翻譯的所有人員,因為第二季翻譯工作的難度之大、任務之重是前所未有的。更要感謝七哥和爆料革命的戰友們,感謝香港的勇士,是七哥和爆料革命以及香港的勇士給了DT挖掘戰隊進行CCP病毒挖掘的勇氣、信心和靈感。最後感謝善良的美國人,感謝他們堅定的信仰所折射出的善良以及對中國人民的友好。感恩美國,這個上帝之子。

《P4實驗室系列 第三季》的構思實際上是在第二季的工作過程中就已經完成了,在與正義科學家的討論中,我們已經逐步明確僅僅壹個第二季的十壹篇文章來揭示P4實驗室的真相,是遠遠不夠的,這只是冰山的壹角。其後續的工作,不僅僅包括我們在第二季中預報的那些外傳,更主要的是依據我們所擁有的龐大的挖掘資料,繼續梳理和解讀,深刻的挖掘CCP病毒產生和使用的過程,P4實驗室背後的秘密。在這壹季中,我們的正義科學家們依舊和DT挖掘機戰隊通力合作,對壹些深奧難懂的生物醫學名詞、概念和涉及到技術問題進行詳細解讀。

中共建黨99年盜國60余年建設的這個體系太龐大了,絕對不是壹季、兩季可以說得清的。這需要DT戰隊投入時間和經歷不斷地去挖掘,所以到底有多少季,不清楚,只能說“壹切已經開始!”。

在第二季中,DT已經聲明過,進行挖掘的全部資料來自公開的互聯網資料查詢,意思就是,DT沒有也沒有使用來自內部的情報,只是根據這些公開的資料進行系統的梳理、統計和分析解讀,當然驗證這些資料的真實性不是DT的工作。基於此,所有DT的推論和結論,讀者可以當成壹個故事來理解,也可以視為真實發生的事實真相,自己去加以邏輯判斷和驗證。其影響,DT挖掘戰隊不負任何責任。

當然DT挖掘戰隊的挖掘工作是十分具有價值的,其價值就是梳理CCP進行戰略行動和布局的思維路徑,就是剝開CCP邪惡行為的思維邏輯本質,明白了這個本質CCP邪惡魔鬼就不可怕了。“知己知彼、百戰百勝”,在與CCP作戰的過程中,很多戰友包括很多機構和國家是處於面對壹種“黑盒”(BLACKBOX)的狀態來面對CCP。關於這壹點,DT可能要多啰嗦幾句。所謂“黑盒”,就是妳不了解它,由此產生的恐懼和猶豫以及錯誤的判斷。七哥所說的“唯真不破”就是解決這個問題破解“黑盒”的方法。

以美國為代表的文明社會與CCP的這場決戰從本質上就是壹場信息戰,CCP構築防火墻使用藍金黃手段的目的就是制造這種“黑盒”,制造壹種信息的不對稱,而制造信息的不對稱則是信息戰的關鍵。例如使用防火墻不僅屏蔽了民眾對真實世界的了解,對真相的了解,通過官方宣傳系統的洗腦淪落為黨國的奴隸、奴才,更主要的是屏蔽了美國對中共的大量真實情報來源,導致美國對中共國的判斷建立在壹個虛假信息或者說真假難辨信息基礎上,這種信息的不對稱最終會影響中美戰略關系決策的美方的決策和判斷。更可怕的是會影響美國的民意甚至美國的大選及政府的政治走向。

在DT挖掘戰隊進行本次挖掘任務的時候,發生了以所謂大量“覺醒義工”集體整合媒體攻擊文貴先生和爆料革命戰友的所謂揭騙事件就是壹個典型的面對“黑盒”信息不對稱的信息戰案例。

我們且不去揭示曾宏之流潛藏的特務身份先分裂法輪功迫害海外民運人士進而針對郭文貴進行抹黑陷害的行徑,僅僅從其所做的事情和所謂的“綠豆蠅”們舉報、新聞曝光的行動上可以看出這些偽類們在面對CCP和美國以及文貴先生領導的爆料革命時信息不對稱,就是他們面對的是壹個黑盒。他們既不了解美國、也不了解中共,更不了解爆料革命,這是極其可悲和可憐的。當然他們制造種種事端的目的也是利用許多人對美國文化、制度、法律、體制的無知制造新的信息不對稱條件下的錯誤判斷所導致的混亂事端。所以,對於某些人的“挖掘我”的叫板,DT是不屑壹顧的。而推出的關於曾宏的挖掘以及關於綠豆蠅的挖掘就是要提醒當事者和戰友註意要先看清CCP這個黑盒到底是什麽。從曾宏的經歷中可以明確的知道壹個特務潛伏到美國成為民運人士的路徑:“包裝成維權人士引導維權打壓維權”“發表反共文章獲得政治資本混入法輪功、政治避難獲取身份和地位、成為民運積極分子發聲分化法輪功”“勇敢挺郭混進爆料革命隊伍,制造事端打擊爆料革命”,註意,這個路徑不是曾宏之流個人發明的路徑或者人設,而是CCP壹貫的手法,而曾宏的三性家奴的表現則完美地證明了他只是壹個可憐的任務執行者,“壹切都是組織的安排”。而DT針對綠豆蠅的挖掘推文更是要揭示CCP利用海外留學生進行海外大外宣的方法和手段,關於具體實施的方法和路徑的深刻挖掘在第三季中會涉及到。可憐的是這些被利用者還在沈睡,不知道自己只是壹枚小小的棋子。DT在挖掘中真心地提醒這些偽類面對這些“黑盒”,有時間去讀讀爆料革命的文章,因為他們對CCP、對美國、對爆料革命都是壹臉懵懂,壹竅不通,在整個世界都在重新審視和面對CCP的大環境下主動地做CCP的幫兇其下場和後果可想而知。

所以通過系列挖掘文章讓所有人把CCP這個“黑箱”變成眼中的“白箱”,看清CCP的本質和這場生化武器病毒戰爭的真相是DT挖掘戰隊的核心目的。

當然,在整個第三季挖掘之前,還有兩個基礎工作要做。

基础工作A 对第二季的总结

我們先對第二季的內容做壹個系統的總結,在第二季裏,我們提出了壹些系統化的觀點和理解,這是我們整個挖掘工作的基礎。主要包括以下內容:

A 在挖掘內容上,註意時間跨度和思考中共行動的根本初衷和原因。註意特殊的時間點和關鍵的變化。

B CCP病毒作為壹種生化基因武器的出現不是偶然的,CCP病毒絕對不是自然產生,而是來自中共的實驗室。

C 使用ABC作為戰略性武器對美國進行戰略決戰是中共這個組織的集體決策;根本原因在於這個組織在價值觀上與美國為代表的文明世界的背離;其邪惡的本質和對財富的搶劫野心必然導致其最終要與美國進行戰略決戰;這個戰略是在八九六四之後由江澤民為代表的上海幫集體繼承鄧小平等上壹代領導人的遺誌而完成的;實施的方式就是通過國家經濟的發展的借口和手段攫取財富,通過國家開放、經濟文化國際交流的手段盜取美國的科技技術從而集中經濟、科研實力發展信息技術為基礎的高科技為代表的戰略軍用設施和武器,將決戰的手段和方法定位為《超限戰》。

D 這個戰略的核心推動者是中科院和北大清華所代表的高校系統。而掌控者則是上海幫。通過這種戰略,完成了高科技控制軍隊、高科技控制國家、高科技控制財富、高科技控制權力從而實現江山永固、財富永續、家族永旺的戰略任務。

E 對美國的藍金黃和3F計劃露出猙獰的面目,藍金黃是手段方法,3F是目的。兩個計劃都是具體實施和行動的方案,並且已經發生。

F CCP病毒只是“ABC”戰略武器研發中的壹種病毒,中共國還有更多的武器和病毒。CCP病毒作為終極生化武器的研發始於2003年的SARS,成型於2016年。其國內的主要研發者是武漢大學的P3實驗室也就是武漢大學的病毒學國家重點實驗室,最終病毒武器的接管者是武漢病毒研究所的P4實驗室。P4實驗室的真正管理者是以軍事醫學科學院為核心單位的軍方文職人員。

G CCP病毒及“ABC”戰略武器的研發動用了幾乎整個中共國的核心科研力量,通過“知識創新工程”等國家項目進行實施和部署,刻意混淆民用與軍用的界限,掩蓋其真相,目的是迷惑美國為主的國際社會和對內愚弄民眾。

H CCP病毒生化武器研制和投放超級戰隊是壹個國際化的戰隊,其布局實施自2003甚至更早就已經開始。其核心是法中基金會和法國的巴斯德機構系統。

I CCP病毒生化武器庫的戰略資源儲備十分龐大,不僅具有最大的病毒毒株儲備,而且在實驗動物、實驗室等硬件條件、研發軟件、基礎數據庫、生物醫學人才等方面進行了長期儲備。

以上各個觀點是第二季進行挖掘和分析的重點結論。

基礎工作B 對中共這種病毒戰略認識的重要性

之所以在第三季的基礎工作中再次強調對中共這種病毒戰略認識的重要性,原因就像《P4實驗室第二季》所揭示的那樣,ABC(核武器、生物武器、化學武器)自壹開始就是中共選擇的針對美國進行戰略決戰的國家戰略武器,這壹決策是CCP第壹代、第二代領導集體決策產生的,由江澤民所代表的第三代領導通過全部國家經濟戰略的軍事化、超限戰思想而具體實施的。換句話說,CCP病毒不是偶然產生的,不是某個瘋狂科學家和政治野心家的個人行為,更不可能是實驗室的泄漏而發生。可以肯定地說,ABC武器的研發就是針對美國。

只有明白並理解和高度重視這壹點也就是高度關註中共ABC武器的戰略目標壹定是美國這壹點才能夠理清“藍金黃計劃”“3F計劃”“千人計劃”等各種計劃中的邏輯和做法的本質核心,也會看清CCP病毒、芬太尼、北鬥計劃、5G、防火墻、海外各種協會、學會、基金會、孔子學院的本質。

所以,江澤民在任軍委主席期間制定的“以信息化為基礎的ABC高技術發展戰略武器分三步走”的國家軍事戰略是第三季挖掘的核心目標和基礎。而在這個基礎上我們尋找線索進行發掘,發現了大量的資料和令人瞠目結舌的事實真相。而這些事實真相背後的邏輯以及彰顯出的路徑又壹次驗證了郭文貴先生爆料視頻內容情報的準確性。所以我們有理由相信江澤民延期軍委主席的任職不僅僅只是權力鬥爭那麽簡單,而似乎更多地是組織的集體決定,是為了確保CCP這個戰略目標的實現和對美國決戰指揮權力的平穩過渡。當然,我們並不否認這裏面具有權力爭鬥的內涵,因為如果不弄權不內鬥那就不是真正地中共了。

在這個決定整個人類命運的偉大時刻,我們欣喜地看到我們的美女英雄科學家出境了,我們堅信,七哥、香港義士、郝董、葉釗穎、英雄科學家的出現只是開始,因為正義必勝,黑暗終將散去。

讓我們再次以美女英雄科學家真摯的微笑畫面作為本文的結束篇:

一切已經開始。

敬請期待下回分解。

本文終。

編輯:【喜馬拉雅戰鷹團】

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Amitofo
1 年 前

“藍金黃計劃”“3F計劃”“千人計劃”等各種計劃中的邏輯和做法的本質核心,也會看清CCP病毒、芬太尼、北鬥計劃、5G、防火墻、海外各種協會、學會、基金會、孔子學院的本質

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linlucious
1 年 前

谢谢了。辛苦了。

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7月 18日, 2020